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To further advance our understanding of the brain, new concepts and theories are needed.
In particular, the ability of the brain to create information flows must be reconciled with its
propensity for synchronization and mass action. The theoretical and empirical framework of
Coordination Dynamics, a key aspect of which is metastability, are presented as a starting
point to study the interplay of integrative and segregative tendencies that are expressed
in space and time during the normal course of brain and behavioral function. Some recent
shifts in perspective are emphasized, that may ultimately lead to a better understanding of
brain complexity.
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THEORIES OF THE BRAIN: A CONCISE HISTORY
How does the brain work? This nagging question is an habitué
from the top ten lists of enduring problems in Science’s grand
challenges. Grasp this paradox: how is one human brain—a
chef d’oeuvre of complexity honed by Nature—ever to reach
such a feast as to understand itself? Where one brain may fail
at this notorious philosophical riddle, may be a strong and
diversely-skilled army of brains may come closer. Understanding
of the local principles at play has emerged due to the com-
bined efforts of many scientists: neurons talk to their part-
ners by teasing them with charged particles of either excitatory
or inhibitory effect, as Nobel laureate Sir John Eccles demon-
strated (Eccles, 1966). Targeted release of ions was later shown
at sites that seem designed for the exchange of information:
typically the axonal termination of the emitting neuron fac-
ing the dendrites of a receiving partner (Hodgkin and Huxley,
1952). Many of those two-some neural interlocutors build into
a reticulum with remarkable emergent properties. A booming
network science followed, generalizing microscale principles on
a large-scale. David Rumelhart and James McClelland, Stephen
Grossberg and many others pursued this connectionist endeavor
(Grossberg, 1976; Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986). Putting
function first, they aimed to model specific aspects of human
cognition and behavior such as visual perception or language.
Yet others, such as Olaf Sporns have devoted much effort to
the neurobiological fidelity of their inquiries, conceiving behav-
ior as an emergent phenomenon from an appropriate connec-
tional design (Sporns et al., 2004). The latter may be probed
both with theoretical connectivity models where brain com-
plexity is carefully thought through (Sporns et al., 2000) along
with empirically-derived models that borrow their connectional
blueprints from images of “real” brains (Honey et al., 2010).
Though brief, this historical overture suggests that the brain has
demonstrable mechanisms for both point-to-point communica-
tion of information—most obviously at the microscale—as well
as emergent phenomena arising from network properties at the
meso- and macroscale.
NEURONAL RELAYS AND THE PROPAGATION OF
INFORMATION
The principle of synaptic transmission proved to be picture-
perfect for a theory of communication, boosted by the influ-
ential work published in 1948 by Claude Shannon (Shannon,
1948). Transfer of information became a principal tenet of brain
function, and theories went so far as to conceive of “centers”
(Charcot, 1878; see perspectives in Catani and ffytche, 2005)
as final destinations for information to be communicated (the
concept has now retreated, although it remains perniciously
present in neuroscientists’ conceptions of brain hierarchies1 (e.g.,
Meunier et al., 2010); an alternate view is that it is the journey,
1Clearly, the brain is not a diffuse web of randomly coupled dynamical
systems. It is a highly structured organ that has been crafted by evolution. The
outcome of phylogenesis, a slow timescale pattern-forming process (Bressler
and Tognoli, 2006) is the progressive emergence of functional specialization,
where some brain regions take on a more integrated role than others, a
phenomenon that has been named hierarchical organization (see Robert,
1999; Zilles et al., 2002 for anatomo-functional patterning, see also Honey
et al., 2007 for a related network perspective). The notion of hierarchy is
popular in neuroscience and may be relevant (see also Kelso and Tuller, 1981
for a discussion of heterarchical and coalitional forms of brain organization):
hierarchical systems induce a distinction between ascending and descending
connections that could contribute to symmetry breaking which may then lead
to directed coupling and information transfer (Tognoli and Kelso, 2014).
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but not an elusive final destination, that really matters). This
theory of information processing in the brain raises a question
that may not have received enough attention: can we readily
transpose findings from the smallest synaptic level—findings that
speak of only a pair of neurons—to larger spatial scales such as
neural areas or the whole brain? In all justice, countless emergent
phenomena were discovered through this extrapolation, both in
empirical and theoretical work (e.g., Sperry, 1969; Hopfield, 1982;
McLeod et al., 1998). But it remains an uneasy feeling that so
much of Brain Science is built upon the foundation of a pair
of neurons, outside the context of their networks, and with two
open-ended areas of darkness at either of their extremities that
must be thought of as the entire remainder of the organism’s brain
(and body).2
COLLECTIVE POWER OF NEURONAL SYNCHRONY
We will come back to information transmission later, but let
us now explore the matter of spatial scales. As humans tend to
agree, increased size makes up for smarter brains (disclosure:
both authors are human), and those bigger brains have room to
organize themselves at multiple levels, coalescing into functional
ensembles at several steps along the way up from neurons to
functional areas and to the entire brain (Kelso, 1995; Bressler
and Tognoli, 2006; Buzsáki, 2007; Kelso et al., 2013; Tognoli and
Kelso, 2013). At larger and more integrated levels of description,
other ordering phenomena were discovered that brain scientists
conceive in terms of information exchange. In the late 1980’s,
two groups of scientists, one with Reinhard Eckhorn (Eckhorn
et al., 1988) and another with Charles Gray and Wolf Singer
(Gray and Singer, 1989), discovered that perceptual integration
2Although much of neuroscience and its methodology focus on commu-
nication between pairs of neurons at the synaptic level, there is a long
tradition of trying to understand the brain in terms of self-organization and
dynamic coordination. For instance, Ross Ashby theorized on regulatory brain
systems, considered under an equilibrium (homeostatic) perspective (Ashby,
1962) and he contributed to developing Cybernetics (“steermanship” born
from control theory). From a more physical perspective, Arthur Iberall’s
Homeokinetics (formulated as Homeodynamics for biology) stressed the
persistent, marginally stable nature of open thermodynamic systems which
necessarily organize themselves as cyclic, physical action modes at all scales
(see Yates, 2008, for review; also Eigen and Schuster, 1979 for a more
formal but related approach). More recent years have seen the emergence of
Synergetics as a foundational mathematical framework for nonequilibrium
self-organization in physics, chemistry and biology (Haken, 1983). Syner-
getic self-organization is one of the cornerstones of Coordination Dynamics
which stresses adaptive, informationally meaningful, bidirectional couplings
on multiple levels (Kelso, 1995; Kelso and Haken, 1995; Kostrubiec et al.,
2012; Kelso et al., 2013). A key notion of Synergetics that overcomes simple
directional interactions between pairs of neurons is so-called circular or
reciprocal causality (see discussions in Kelso, 1995; Kelso and Engstrøm,
2006; Tognoli and Kelso, 2013). In a multiscale perspective, circular causality
manifests itself in terms of the micro and macroscopic states of a system
reciprocally affecting each other; such that the macroscopic (ensemble) behav-
ior enslaves the microscopic states, the ensemble average of which in turn
produces the macroscopic states. It is possible that the formalism called for
in this essay will rest upon outstanding developments along these lines. On
the other hand, since “macro” and “micro” are relative terms in neurobi-
ological dynamical systems where the timescales are not well-separated, a
more systematic level by level approach may be required (see Kelso et al.,
2013).
(or Gestalt) elicited transiently synchronous action potentials
amongst neurons that had shared-stakes in the sensory object
being viewed. Those neurons dealt with separate parts of the
visual field, and they generally disagreed on when to elicit their
action potentials in the regular course of their participation
in visual function. Somehow however, through the complex
labyrinth of the visual cortex and despite the fact that some
finite amount of time was required to get from any one to any
other of them (delays and frustrations manifested in their usual
asynchrony), they managed to coincide when they responded
to the same object. What we knew from those neurons is that
they “responded” strongly to orientation, fragments of contours
with sharp luminance gradients. Their synchrony it seems, was a
trace of their joint participation in the construction of something
bigger (the object) than what each of them was about (pieces
of contour). These discoveries resonated with earlier theorizing
regarding the organized behavior of neurons such as Donald
Hebb’s cell assemblies (Hebb, 1949) or Walter Freeman’s mass
action (Freeman, 1975). The findings by Eckhorn, Singer and
Gray launched a relentless quest for synchrony in all parts of
the brain and for numerous functions (von der Malsburg et al.,
2010), and took the form of several variants (the most basic being
coincidence of action potentials and phase-locking of neural
oscillations).
IRRECONCILABLES
Theories and dedicated experimental paradigms were built upon
both discoveries of synaptic transmission and neural synchroniza-
tion. And from each side, supporting evidence abounded (see pre-
viously mentioned references for evidence and reviews). In spite
of their prominence and ubiquity though, the theories carefully
avoided confrontation with each other, remaining mostly in the
separate territories of distinct research groups.3 One may note
already some difficulties in reconciling them. Let us follow the
two extreme views: perfect synchronization and perfect transfer.
If all neurons were completely synchronized, they would remain
in a changeless state of simultaneity. It is unclear how this system
could have flows of information from one place to another. On the
other end, if each neuron relayed information in a strict sense, the
system would lack basic simultaneity through which synchronous
phenomena could emerge. In their radical form it seems, the
theories of information exchange qua synaptic transfer or neural
synchrony are mutually exclusive.
CANWE FIND DIRECTIONS IN THE BRAIN?
The tension is also visible in some empirical facts. Although
directed flows of information in the Shannonian spirit do most
certainly occur in neural networks, it is indeed quite challenging
to track information otherwise than in local or statistical sense
(by tracking, we mean to follow the path of information on
a brain map as one would follow any object in motion on a
symbolic representation of its spatial domain—see Figure 1). The
3There are few exceptions, for instance Fries’ (2005) theory of communication
through coherence that uses the phase of macroscopic patterns of coherence as
a scaffold for selective modulation of information transfer at the microscopic
level.
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FIGURE 1 | A teasing figure aimed at marking difference between
directionality in well-formed Shannonian systems (as in this
imaginary brain map) and in complex systems such as the brain.
In the latter, direction is less intuitive past immediate spatial and
temporal neighborhoods, and it can reverse across spatial scales of
observation (Tognoli and Kelso, 2013). The question is highly relevant
though, when one is concerned with where and how to effect changes
in the system.
brain network after all, is a web, as Francisco Varela et al. (2001)
emphasized, and one gets quickly lost with all the branchings,
loops and loops within loops (Edelman, 1993; Gallos et al., 2012);
structural features that “distribute” information (albeit unlike
a postmaster distributes mail). So it seems that transmission
principles do not scale well upward from simple “channels” of
synaptic interactions to the larger and more complex web of
evolved brains. Thus, it is without surprise that the brain betrays
an essential communicational etiquette: its parts do not behave
in a sequential—one-talks-at-a-time—manner (as opposed to the
humoristic illustration of Figure 1). It is also overwhelmingly
clear that “inputs” from the environment do not enter a silent
system. Brain parts constantly exchange information about their
current and past affairs, and what comes in at a given time works
more as a “perturbation” to an already established ballet, an
event that weaves itself within a broader scheme of coordinated
brain behavior rather than the sole commander of all things
present (Kelso, 1995). All of these nuances differentiate the brain
from a channel in which information is transferred from sender
to receiver. This situation creates mounting complications. The
quest for directional flows in the brain has proved difficult both
conceptually and methodologically, yet, it has not deterred efforts
toward understanding. Mathematical and empirical studies aimed
at resolving these questions are an active area pursued by many,
including our own colleagues (Bressler et al., 2007; Bressler and
Seth, 2011).
BRAIN ORGANIZATION: SYNCHRONIZATION OR
COORDINATION?
The second concept, synchrony, also bears its share of ambiguities.
The firm ground on which we stand is that the timing of neural
activity is not left to hazard (as if parts of the brain behaved
independently, and were totally oblivious of what the others
were doing). “When” one brain part behaves influences when
others do. And like social creatures, neurons also use the power
of their numbers to increase their impact, creating collective
structures that speak from a common voice. A generic name
for such behavior is coordination (Kelso, 1995). Synchrony is a
narrower concept, one of several ways for a system to coordinate
itself. Though synchrony has multiple meanings (and though
its study uses a variety of tools across the board), it is easy to
conceive and to model, perhaps explaining its systematic resort.
To be rigorous however, synchrony requires two important and
inter-related characteristics: first, that the underlying temporal
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order in which the system is embedded be frequency-locked, and
second, that attractors have emerged in the system’s coordination
dynamics (attractors are mathematical structures that entrap the
system’s coordination dynamics into persistent—hard to break—
states). How to examine if there are attractors in the system
from empirical data? We do know how to go from theoretical
descriptions of dynamics with- and without-attractors to their
phenomenology (using models to create data at will), but we
are not very successful at taking the return path: demonstrating
attractors or lack thereof from looking at data, at least for com-
plicated systems like the brain. The other criterion, frequency-
locking, is a little bit easier. And what the data say is that brain
parts exhibit tendencies toward frequency-locking without going
all the way to being perfectly identical. So it seems, we could
be dealing with synchronous tendencies rather than synchrony
(Kelso, 2008; Tognoli and Kelso, 2014). The difference may seem
subtle to some (and some might be tempted to brush it aside
as noise or measurement uncertainty), but mathematically and
conceptually, it is enormous: it speaks of two entirely different
species of dynamical systems, as said before, one with and the
other without attractors. We are turning the spotlight to this
distinction because we believe it to be paramount for progress in
understanding the brain.
The mathematical formalism of “generalized synchronization”
(Rulkov et al., 1995; see also Barreto et al., 2000) is apt to quan-
tify such regimes of coordination sans attractors. Generalized
synchronization assumes the existence of a functional mapping
between two dynamical processes, without imposing the strong
constraint of identical synchronization usually sought for in clas-
sical measures of coherence and correlation. The notion of gen-
eralized synchrony is set to grow in importance in the context of
a coordination dynamic between weakly coupled components—a
beneficial situation that enhances system complexity. The absence
of complexity is a nefarious situation that André Gide related to
tyranny.
AT THE CROSSROADS OF PROPAGATION AND
SYNCHRONIZATION
We hope that the previous exposé motivated the thought that
neural networks neither operate on perfect synchrony nor on
strict transfer, which is good news as each prevents expression of
important features of the other. What then is the link between
them? Some attempts at studying synchrony and transfer in
a common formalism have emerged, exceptions to their usual
avoidance of one another. One is the quest for quantifying direc-
tional coupling as discussed above. Another attempt is functional
(relatedly, effective) connectivity,4 a daring concept that Karl
Friston created on his way to developing theoretical and compu-
tational tools for the analysis of functional images of the brain
(Friston, 1994). Connectivity deals with ways for information to
4Karl Friston (1994) intended functional connectivity to expose temporal
correlations between neurophysiological events—a descriptive approach with-
out a priori specification that the originating structures would affect one
another—whereas effective connectivity is meant to address explicit influences
between brain parts (how much does A affect B, an estimation based on
a priori model of those areas’ relations, later reframed as causality).
go from one place to another. Ideally, we would be able to measure
the connection (the “traffic” between two sites) independently
from the state of those sites where said traffic imparts effect (as
one would measure how many cars travel on the road between
two cities). If independently measured, large scale connectivity
and local activity would be amenable to reveal their effect on
each other. Since we do not have adequate tools to measure
the flow of information in living fiber tracts at large though,
connectivity is not measured directly; rather it is inferred from
the way brain components behave. Interaction, it is postulated,
has to leave detectable traces in the behavior of its partici-
pants. Of course, contemporaneous theories have shaped the lens
through which scientists have tried to see this influence. To make
things practical, the assumption was often made that regions
exchanging information must be correlated or synchronized
(connectivity→correlation). Flipping things around for the oper-
ational goal of quantifying the unquantifiable information flow,
“how much regions were correlated” became the proxy for how
much they exchanged information (correlation→connectivity).
But with only this concept of synchronization under the scope,
we may see a mere fraction of the brain at work, the tip of
the iceberg. What if most coordinated behaviors in the brain
do not fall under our definition of correlation or synchrony?
Depending on the methods used, that would mean for instance
brain regions that are coordinated yet not temporally coincident;
or assemblies in which self-organization favors a fluid coordi-
nation regime sans-attractor (such as metastable tendencies, to
be discussed below) over rigid states of phase-locking. Can we
see dynamics in which no absolute “order” emerges in space
(synchronization) or in time (transfer), and still make sense of
it as a means for the brain to function? Those are the dark and
uncharted areas in the spatiotemporal organization of complex
systems—those for which we sorely lack concepts and methods
(Figure 2).
ENLARGING THE SCOPE: METASTABILITY
The set of questions above resonates with a recent shift in
perspective on brain function, from a primary focus on neu-
ral synchronization to the broader—and deeper—problem of
dynamic coordination. This shift was salient in the editorial
introduction to a special issue of Nature Review Neuroscience
in February 2010, where the word “coordination” occurred six
times in a short text of 250 words (From The Editors, 2010).
And this is a concept that is growing (Kelso, 1995, 2012;
Bressler and Kelso, 2001; Kelso and Tognoli, 2007; Werner,
2007; Rabinovich et al., 2008; Tognoli and Kelso, 2009, 2013,
2014; von der Malsburg et al., 2010; Farmer, 2011; Kelso et al.,
2013). Coordination includes synchronization as one possible
collective behavior, but it also considers many other ways for
components of the brain to interact. In particular, under certain
conditions partially synchronized behaviors arise. In them, the
parts exhibit simultaneous tendencies to temporarily couple and
to segregate as independent entities. Such metastable regimes,
we and others have shown, constitute a recipe for complexity
(Kelso, 1995, 2012; Friston, 1997; Freeman and Holmes, 2005;
Kelso and Tognoli, 2007; Werner, 2007; Rabinovich et al., 2008;
Tognoli and Kelso, 2009, 2013, 2014; Bhowmik and Shanahan,
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FIGURE 2 | A graph of spatiotemporal organization. The horizontal axis
quantifies the degree of order in space; order in time is on the vertical axis.
Examples of orderly phenomena are propagation and synchronization.
There are numerous hints that the brain is more efficient with less than
complete order in space and time. The dark area represents this region with
incomplete spatial and temporal order, for which concepts and tools are
sorely missing.
2013; Kelso et al., 2013). Why is metastable coordination dynam-
ics of high interest to understanding how the brain works?
First, it typically arises when the parts are no longer perfect
clones of one another (e.g., as in computational models built
from collections of identical neurons). When symmetry is bro-
ken and interacting parts are recognized in the diversity of
their intrinsic behavior, a more realistic picture of brain func-
tion emerges (indeed a trend toward studying more diverse
associations in the brain may explain the shift in perspective,
for instance the interactions between neurons and astrocytes,
see, e.g., Wade et al., 2013). Second, incomplete synchronization
is more adaptive than pure forms. A fundamental nonlinearity
in brain self-organization exists. Too much autonomy (parts
of the brain hardly ever affected by what others are doing)
prevents emergence, integration and mass action (Uhlhaas and
Singer, 2006). Yet, too much integration (for instance the whole
brain engaged in a giant common behavior, Cruikshank and
Connors, 2008) is inadequate too, because the respective parts
can no longer do what they are supposed to do in contribut-
ing to collective behavior. The parts then have no choice but
to behave exactly like each other and the richness of their
individual dispositions is lost to the ensemble. It is enough to
note—as many have—that excess synchronization is pathologi-
cal in the brain, for instance in epilepsy or Parkinson’s disease
(Uhlhaas and Singer, 2006; Hammond et al., 2007; Lehnertz
et al., 2009). As a result, the ideal place for a brain to exhibit
a rich set of meaningful behaviors is in-between integration
and segregation. This is where the “incomplete” synchroniza-
tion tendencies or metastable coordination comes into play
(Tononi et al., 1994; Kelso, 1995, 2012; Friston, 1997; Werner,
2007; Chialvo, 2010; Tognoli and Kelso, 2013, 2014). Elsewhere,
we have also speculated on the tremendous functional advan-
tages that metastability would confer to a system, including
speed, flexibility and resilience (Kelso and Tognoli, 2007; Kelso,
2012).
CREATING A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The gap between our current understanding of the brain and
the miracles of our mental life and behavioral achievements
(for example, consciousness and capacity for invention) remains
abysmal. Looking through the history of science, several
paradigms of brain function flourished and then dried up
following the ebbs and flows of scientific metaphors. The ultimate
model, the one that allows to forecast all matters of brain action
and to design an artificial counterpart of multiple functional
prowesses, remains out of sight. Two lines of thinking have
been much explored in recent times: information transfer and
synchronization. Their success owes much to the fact that they
are special cases and open to quantification. When examined
together though, they reveal some incompatibilities that seem
to require a relaxation of both principles: less stringent tem-
poral order and less complete spatial order. To advance our
understanding of the brain, Neuroscience must open up avenues
to study functional behavior in a broader sense. We face two
alternatives: to leave it all within the current framework, with
the approximate truth derived from current theories (the brain
“sort of transfers information”, and it operates with “near syn-
chrony”), or to face the issue head on with a different theoretical
mindset. In the latter case, a new phenomenology is up for
grasp. It will be difficult to conceptualize, and even more so to
observe, since it points toward a void in understanding. Modeling
approaches can lead the way, by informing which observables
we can expect to encounter in the coordinating living brain.
And tools will have to be revised or built to adapt to this new
world, tools that will say for instance, when “more synchrony”
is “too much synchrony” (astonishingly, this simple question is
not built into our current enquiries, despite obvious evidence
of the ills of excess synchrony). We note that Brain Science is
reaching a turning point that may make this renewal possible:
it shows many signs of its readiness to enlarge the scope on
brain function, not least of which is a recent outburst of interest
in segregation phenomena (Poulet and Petersen, 2008; Ecker
et al., 2010; Renart et al., 2010). A new paradigm would help to
integrate principles that seem contradictory in their radical form:
transfer and synchronization, as well as integration and segrega-
tion. Those pairs of concepts are reconciled under the dynam-
ical regime of metastability (Kelso, 1995; Kelso and Engstrøm,
2006; Kelso and Tognoli, 2007; Tognoli and Kelso, 2014). Parts
making-up the brain (for instance molecules, neurons, or brain
areas) have simultaneous tendencies for independence and coop-
eration. As a result, they engage in the double-duty of lend-
ing their help to the collective behavior undertaken by several
brain parts, and of performing their own independent behavior.
Under a metastable regime, information is continuously created,
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preserved and annihilated by spatiotemporally changing coali-
tions among parts and processes. This is a source of dynamic
complexity, and the likely origin of the human brain’s many
prowesses.
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